Preisstabilität und Unabhängigkeit sind die tragenden Säulen des Zentralbankstatuts der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
(EWU). Politische Unabhängigkeit gilt als die wesentliche Voraussetzung für eine primär am Ziel der Preisstabilität orientierte
Geldpolitik. Das Europäische Zentralbanksystem verfügt über einen außerordentlich hohen Grad an Unabhängigkeit, wodurch die
Voraussetzungen für eine erfolgreiche Geldpolitik umfassend gegeben erscheinen.
Keywords:Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems; Schwerpunkt "Geldpolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion";
Underpinnings of the European System of Central Banks
Research group:Macroeconomics and Public Finance
Language:German
Underpinnings of the European System of Central Banks
Efforts concentrate on developing the institutional structure which will govern European monetary policy while securing a
suitable level of independence. The strong emphasis on independence begs the question of the extent to which accountability
can be safeguarded, which is of vital importance for the efficiency as well as acceptance of the Bank's monetary policy. If
a high level of independence is secured, a new institution, which has not yet established a reputation as a credible actor
in monetary policy, should aim at a high degree of transparency vis-à-vis the public as a useful tool to reduce uncertainties
and build up a suitable track record. The ESCB has indicated its intention of taking steps in this direction which will go
beyond what is customary in many of its member states. Nevertheless, it will not initially achieve the extraordinarily high
level of transparency displayed by the Bank of England (which derives from entirely different prerequisites). Misunderstandings
abound as to the institutional structures and responsibilities assigned to the future European monetary policy. Monetary policy
has been defined as a responsibility to be assumed by the ESCB, which consists of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national central banks. Decisions are made by the Governing Council of the ECB, which consists of the Executive Board and
the 11 governors from the national central banks, who are, however, not acting as representatives of their respective national
central banks. The ECB implements their decisions, drawing on the national central banks in doing so. Demands, frequently
simplified, to increase centralisation of the ECB's monetary policy, i.e., to grant the Executive Board sole decision-making
power for monetary policy, are opposed to the framework stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty and would actually require a fundamental
change in the allocation of responsibilities.
