Studie von: Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung – Supply Chain Intelligence Institute Austria
The EU Directive on Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence has sparked fierce debate about the regulation of supply chains. The
directive’s objectives are aligned with European values. However, it raises concerns that the compliance costs of social and
environmental regulations may be privatised in complex supply networks, particularly in third countries with weak enforcement
mechanisms. This paper suggests options to make the directive more effective and efficient. It suggests excluding countries
with sufficient regulatory systems and focusing only on supplier-buyer relationships instead of the entire network. Public
agencies should set harmonised regulatory standards, interpret the regulations and organise a private certification scheme
in which certification companies assume liabilities. The proposed system resembles the market for financial auditors.
ASCII schlägt eine Überarbeitung der EU-Richtlinie zur Lieferkettensorgfaltspflicht vor, der EU Corporate Sustainable Due
Diligence Directive. Die Richtlinie basiert auf europäischen Werten und ist zu begrüßen. Um eine kosteneffiziente Umsetzung
zu ermöglichen, sollte sie sich auf die Überwachung von Zulieferern konzentrieren, anstatt auf bilaterale Beziehungen zwischen
Käufern und Verkäufern. Negativ- und Positivlisten von Ländern und Zulieferern sollten eingeführt werden. Solche Listen enthalten
ausländische Zulieferer, denen die Teilnahme an EU-Lieferketten verboten (Negativlisten) oder erlaubt (Positivlisten) ist.
Mit Unternehmen auf Negativlisten dürfen keine Geschäfte getätigt werden. Bei Verträgen mit Unternehmen, die auf Positivlisten
stehen, müssen EU-Importeure keine Sorgfaltsprüfung der Unternehmen durchführen. Dies senkt die Gesamtkosten der Verordnung
für EU-Importeure, verringert die Wahrscheinlichkeit unerwünschter Nebenwirkungen und macht das Instrument wirksamer. Die
Nichteinhaltung durch einen ausländischen Zulieferer kann zur Streichung von der Liste führen, was einem EU-weiten Exportverbot
gleichkommt und somit die Marktmacht des EU-Binnenmarktes nutzt. Die Wirksamkeit würde auch dadurch erhöht, dass die Rechtsunsicherheit
für Unternehmen verringert und der Geltungsbereich der Verordnung über in der EU ansässige Produktionsnetzwerke hinaus ausgedehnt
würde.
ASCII proposes a revision of the EU directive on supply chain due diligence, the EU Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive.
The directive is based on European values and is to be welcomed. ASCII suggests that the Directive should focus, where possible,
on direct monitoring of suppliers rather than on bilateral relationships between buyers and sellers. The directive should
be amended to allow the use of negative and positive lists of countries and suppliers. Such lists contain foreign suppliers
that are prohibited (negative lists) or authorised (positive lists) to participate in EU supply chains. When contracting with
companies on positive lists, EU importers do not have to carry out due diligence on the companies. They are prohibited from
doing business with companies on negative lists. The Directive will continue to apply to non-listed companies. This reduces
the overall cost of the regulation for EU importers, reduces the likelihood of unwanted side-effects and makes the instrument
more effective, as non-compliance by a foreign supplier leads to delisting throughout the EU, not just with a single buyer.
It would also increase effectiveness by reducing legal uncertainty and extending the scope of the regulation beyond EU-based
production networks.
Review of International Economics, 2023, 31, (5), S.1571-1893
Leading theories suggest that amongst continuing exporters, lower variable trade costs should boost exports of smaller firms
by the same or greater percentage rate than larger firms. However, investigating the impact of the deep EU-South Korea FTA
with French customs data, we find robust evidence to the contrary. Applying a triple-difference framework, we report that
the FTA increased sales in the top quartile of continuous exporters by 71.5 percent points more than in the bottom quartile.
More than 90 percent of that growth premium is driven by reductions in NTBs. These findings suggest an additional channel
driving the distributional effects of FTAs.
Constantinos Syropoulos, Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Erdal Yalcin, Yoto V. Yotov
This paper introduces the third update or release of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB-R3). The GSDB-R3 extends the period
of coverage from 1950-2019 to 1950-2022, which includes two special periods – COVID-19 and the new sanctions against Russia.
This update of the GSDB contains a total of 1,325 cases. In response to multiple inquiries and requests, the GSDB-R3 has been
amended with a new variable that distinguishes between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. As before, the GSDB comes in
two versions, case-specific and dyadic, which are freely available upon request at GSDB@drexel.edu. To highlight one of the
new features of the GSDB, we estimate the heterogeneous effects of unilateral and multilateral sanctions on trade. We also
obtain estimates of the effects on trade of the 2014 sanctions on Russia.
Marian Leimbach, Michael Hübler, Hendrik Mahlkow, Lorenzo Montrone, Eduard Bukin, Gabriel Felbermayr, Matthias Kalkuhl, Johannes Koch, Marcos Marcolino, Frank Pothen, Jan Steckel
The decarbonisation of India's economy will affect economic actors differently. Here we study the distributional effects of
climate policy in India, taking the specific role of structural economic change into account. We contrast distributional effects
from climate policy with distributional effects from structural change and quantify how far carbon pricing supports structural
change and economic development. We develop and apply a comprehensive model framework that combines long-term growth and medium-term
trade dynamics related to structural change with detailed household income and expenditure data for India. Our results emphasise
that distributional effects from structural change are stronger than from carbon pricing. Consequently, governments should
not focus solely on the distributional effects of climate policy, but also consider the larger context of economic transformation
processes when designing and implementing social policies.