This paper studies the direct and indirect trade volume and trade cost effects of uncertainty on international trade and economic
welfare using a structural gravity framework for a panel of 97 developed and developing countries from 2000 to 2018. We find
that the sign and magnitude of the effect depend on whether uncertainty originates from the importing or exporting country.
Moreover, applying a cross-sectional gravity model, we show that an uncertainty shock directly reduces cross-border trade
flows. The paper illustrates the suitability of the proposed modelling approach by means of two counterfactual scenario analyses
in which we calculate the general equilibrium trade and welfare effects of uncertainty induced by the unexpected outcome of
the Brexit referendum in 2016 and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
In this paper, we revisit the evidence on the effects of time spent on border‐crossing procedures for international trade
using a theory‐consistent structural gravity model. We exploit a rich panel dataset including domestic trade flows and employ
a recent econometric estimator that exhibits favourable asymptotic properties for inference. The results indicate a significant
negative effect of the time required for border procedures that is driven by the time needed for document preparation. We
find that an additional day spent on those procedures corresponds to an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 0.4 percentage points.
The parameters of our structural model are used to simulate three counterfactual scenarios, quantifying the effect of past
and potential future trade facilitation efforts for middle‐, low‐, and high‐income countries. Full endowment general equilibrium
effects suggest that in times of stagnating multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization efforts, unilateral implementation
of trade facilitation carries the potential to induce an alternative stimulus for trade and welfare, especially for low‐ and
middle‐income countries.
This paper proposes a new panel data structural gravity approach for estimating the trade and welfare effects of Brexit. Assuming
different counterfactual post-Brexit scenarios, our main findings suggest that the UK's exports of goods to the EU are likely
to decline within a range between 7.2 percent and 45.7 percent six years after Brexit has taken place. For the UK, the negative
trade effects are only partially offset by an increase in domestic trade and trade with third countries, inducing a decline
in the UK's real income of between 0.3 percent and 5.7 percent. The estimated welfare effects for the EU are not different
from zero, but some members like Ireland are expected to also experience welfare losses.
This paper empirically investigates the propagation of fims' expectations within the European Union (EU). To this end, we
combine EU-wide official business survey data with world input-output data. Econometrically, we model interdependencies in
economic activities via input-output-linkages and apply space-time models with common factors. The resulting evidence provides
indication for the existence of substantial spillovers in expectation formation. They are transmitted both upstream and downstream
the European value chain, but the latter channel matters more.
Entscheidungen auf Basis wissenschaftlicher Analysen zu treffen, wäre eine gute Idee. Sie scheitert – auch, weil in Österreich
viele Daten nicht zugängig sind.
Die Europäische Union investiert jährlich mehr als 50 Mrd. € in die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit
und Attraktivität europäischer Regionen und Städte. Die EU-Regionalpolitik verfolgt das Ziel, durch gezielte Förderungen zu
einer Steigerung des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums, der Beschäftigung und der Lebensqualität in allen europäischen Regionen beizutragen.
In diesem Policy Brief wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob die Bürger und Bürgerinnen in jenen Regionen, in denen die EU-Regionalpolitik
zu zusätzlichem Beschäftigungswachstum führt, auch tatsächlich proeuropäischer eingestellt sind und ihre Wahlentscheidung
dementsprechend treffen. Untersucht wird die Frage anhand der französischen Präsidentschaftswahl im Jahr 2017 und des Wahlerfolges
der euroskeptischen Kandidatin Marine Le Pen sowie des proeuropäischen Kandidaten Emmanuel Macron. Die hier vorgestellten
Hauptergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Wähler und Wählerinnen in Regionen, in denen durch die EU-Regionalförderung zusätzliche
Beschäftigung generiert wurde, in einem geringeren Ausmaß für Marine Le Pen stimmten.
