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Given the size and the relative strength of the British financial service industry, the decision to pull out of the Single Market may well have more severe consequences on financial services rather than manufacturing. Brexit will create serious non-tariff trade barriers, dampening foreign trade in financial services and the local production of financial services in the UK. In the short term, continuity of existing cross border contracts requires bilateral transitional agreements between the European Commission, individual member countries of the EU 27 and the UK. In the medium to long term, the international nature of financial markets in the UK suggests resilience as a global financial centre but business related to the EU 27 is likely to migrate due to regulatory demands by the European supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank.

Given the size and the relative strength of the British financial service industry, the decision to pull out of the Single Market may well have more severe consequences on financial services rather than manufacturing. Brexit will create serious non-tariff trade barriers, dampening foreign trade in financial services and the local production of financial services in the UK. In the short term, continuity of existing cross border contracts requires bilateral transitional agreements between the European Commission, individual member countries of the EU 27 and the UK. In the medium to long term, the international nature of financial markets in the UK suggests resilience as a global financial centre but business related to the EU 27 is likely to migrate due to regulatory demands by the European supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank.

Österreichs Föderalismus ist durch eine komplexe und oft wenig transparente Verflechtung von Aufgaben-, Ausgaben- und Finanzierungsverantwortlichkeiten zwischen den gebietskörperschaftlichen Ebenen gekennzeichnet, welche die gesamtstaatliche Steuerung beträchtlich erschwert. Um Effizienz- und Steuerungsdefizite zu mildern, wird in Wissenschaft und finanzpolitischer Praxis schon geraume Zeit diskutiert, den Finanzausgleich stärker "aufgabenorientiert" zu gestalten. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert, ob und wieweit eine verstärkte Aufgabenorientierung mit Konstruktionsprinzipien des Föderalismus und der institutionellen Kongruenz kompatibel ist.

The FairTax project addresses the impact of EU national tax systems on widening socio-economic and gender inequalities as well as fiscal sustainability and tax fairness issues. This research will help improve economic stability while promoting economic, social and environmental sustainability.

The design of tax systems has a considerable impact on the personal distribution of income and wealth at the household and the individual level. Due to gender-differentiated socio-economic conditions, taxation may affect men and women differently. One of the most important areas of taxation is the personal income tax, which may have a gender-differentiated effect on work incentives and influence the distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women. The paper presents an overview of the microsimulation results for selected provisions of the personal income tax system done with EUROMOD (a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union) for six selected Member States: Germany, Austria, Spain, Czech Republic, United Kingdom and Sweden.

In the current negotiations about the European Union's next medium-term Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021 to 2027, the system of own resources financing EU expenditures plays a relatively important role. Currently, the EU budget primarily rests on contributions from Member States (VAT- and GNI-based own resources), whereas "true" own resources have continuously lost importance. In 2017, VAT-based own resources accounted for 12.2 percent of overall EU revenues and GNI-based own resources for 56.6 percent, while traditional own resources contributed the rather small share of 14.7 percent.

Nicht bloß Staatsschulden gelten als grundsätzlich kontraproduktiv, erhebliche Angst besteht auch vor einer Überschuldung der Unternehmen. Dabei wird übersehen, dass die Schulden gesamtwirtschaftlich stets so hoch sein müssen wie die Ersparnisse; solange die Ersparnisse steigen – und das ist bei steigendem Wohlstand zu erwarten –, müssen auch die Schulden steigen. Bei dem etwa 2-prozentigen Wachstum, das auch für die Zukunft zu erwarten ist, reicht der investitionsbedingte Verschuldungsbedarf der Wirtschaft nicht aus, um die gesamten Ersparnisse aufzunehmen. Der daraus resultierende Nachfragemangel dämpft das Wachstum und kann Rezessionen auslösen. Um das zu vermeiden, muss der Staat die überschüssigen Ersparnisse aufnehmen. Das ist unproblematisch, wenn die Verschuldung für wohlstandssteigernde Investitionen verwendet wird; darunter sind nicht bloß Investitionen in die materielle Infrastruktur, sondern auch in die immaterielle – Bildung, Gesundheit usw. – zu verstehen. An die Stelle der Schuldenregel sollte eine Investitionsregel treten.

This paper contributes to debates about the appropriate characterisation of heterogeneous investment types and to what extent different investment motives affect the responsiveness to corporate taxation. In particular, we employ and refine a methodology to better evaluate the tax elasticity of investment types. Using a combination of both firm‐specific and sector‐specific information from input-output tables, we discuss how to classify investment as non‐related, horizontal, vertical and complex types. First, we point out to what extent the resulting classification depends on assumptions made by the researcher. Second, we employ an ample set of classifications and find that non‐related investment reacts stronger to corporate taxation, whereas horizontal investment is less responsive, though, significant negative tax semi‐elasticities turn out for the subset of manufacturing industries. To address inherent characteristics of vertical and complex investment, we extend the methodology and find that, by and large, stronger business motives reduce the tax responsiveness of investment to a larger extent. Given the current debates about substantial corporate tax reforms, it is all the more important to recognise that corporate tax effects can vary fundamentally between countries, driven by country‐specific differences in their composition of industries and investment types.